NEWS

>> MDST's projections for 2017.more.

>> SM Line - its first months.more.

>> North American East Coast Port Expansion.more.

>> Japan-EU Trade Deal.more.

>> The Ocean Network Express.more.

>> The Qatar crisis: impact on container shipping services.more.

>> Maritime Professional Services Award.more.

>> Invest in rail freight to cut road congestion.more.

>> South Bradford Lorry Parking Study.more.

>> New Mega Alliances.more.

>> Businesses have their say on freight transport in the Marches.more.

>> Free trade zones at UK ports & airports.more.

>> Non alliance shipping lines.more.

>> New mega alliances.more.

>> Transpacific - port coverage from April 1st.more.

>> Are direct services becoming less attractive for shipping lines?. more.

>> What happens to the small ships post Panama Canal expansion?. more.

>> Maersk to acquire Hamburg-Sud and reinforce its presence on the Latin America routes. more.

>>£0.5 trillion of trade passes through UK ports. More.

>> The future of rail freight and private investment. More.

>> The Northern Freight and Logistics report. More. 

>> Oxford Cambridge Expressway Study. More.

>> The potential impact of Brexit on trade. More.

>> India - the impact of shipping lines’ consolidation and the cabotage rule change. More.

>> Iran – changes in maritime services post-sanctions. more.

>> 'India: The only way is up' say MDST in an article published by Lloyds List. More.

>> Hanjin’s collapse - A wake-up call to the industry? More.

>> Peak season 2016: could the seemingly more rational shipping lines restore stability to the market?. More.

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Non alliance shipping lines

Last month we took a look at the introduction of the two new mega alliances that began operations on April 1st: the Ocean Alliance (Orient Overseas Container Line, Cosco Shipping Line, Evergreen Line, CMA CGM with its APL brand) and THE Alliance (NYK Line, MOL, ‘K’ Line, Yang Ming Line, and Hapag-Lloyd-United Arab Shipping Co). For May, we will be looking at the non alliance shipping lines: Hyundai, SM Line, ZIM, PIL and Wan Hai. These five lines are present on the traditional East/West routes to varying degrees and they also participate in other trade lanes.

While not a vessel provider to 2M, Hyundai takes up slots on its network and in return Maersk and MSC gain access to not only their transpacific network but also, for some, their Ultra-Large Container Ships (ULCs). 38% of Hyundai’s fleet (10,000teu+) has been chartered out to the 2M Alliance members who now operate these vessels. The remaining ULCs are now redeployed to the Far East- Mid East trades having operated on the Asia-Europe network last year. As a vessel operator Hyundai has pulled out of the Europe & Mediterranean trades whilst increasing its capacity on the Far East-Gulf & ISC and Intra-Asia lanes, the latter strengthened by the increasing cooperation of Korean shipping lines and the formation of the HMM+K2 and Mini Alliance.

Hanjin’s demise has led to its transpacific west coast operations coming into the hands of the newly formed SM Line which intends to enter east coast operations in 2018. The new carrier, which has also begun intra-Asia operations, has quickly acquired 17 containerships within just a few months; a number of these being former Hanjin tonnage. Whilst SM Line’s vessel acquisition policy has been rapid, the number of trade lanes it participates in is more cautious when compared to the extensive network seen by its predecessor Hanjin. With Hanjin’s exodus and Hyundai’s reduction in regions served, the number of trade lanes served by the Korean deep sea lines (which also includes KMTC) has decreased as well as deployed capacity (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Korean deep sea shipping lines deployed capacity (mTEU) by trade lane

2016Q2

2017Q2

   

Source: MDS Transmodal Containership Databank, 2016Q2 and 2017Q2

Since withdrawing from the highly competitive Asia- Europe trades, Israeli shipping line ZIM has become a global niche player. With vessels no larger than 10,000teu it has remained on trade lanes where it can compete and where size does not always matter. In some instances, Zim calls into secondary or peripheral ports, such as Tarragona rather than Barcelona, Da Chan Bay as opposed to the bigger terminals such as Chiwan and Shekou. Panamax vessels remain the workhorse of its fleet (Figure 2), operating over 50 of the type at a time when the beleaguered sector has experienced a large number being sold for scrap over the past twelve months. With the expansion of the Panama Canal and the raising of the Bayonne Bridge, Zim is in the process of introducing vessels of 8,200-10,000teu on its Far East – US East Coast, ‘ZCP’ service. Zim also has slot agreements on the Med-USEC trade lane with Hapag-Lloyd and THE Alliance whilst also takin space on the Hyundai’s transpacific PS2 loop.

Similarly, PIL could be bracketed as a niche line, deploying most of it tonnage to the Far East – Africa and Red Sea markets. It offers direct deep sea links from China/North Asia to East African ports in a market where bigger lines (and bigger ships) tranship at one of the Indian Ocean hubs. For the time being East African ports are not capable of serving large containerships so that PIL with its modest fleet largely of Panamax vessels (see Figure2) can compete even with the likes of Maersk.  Whilst these niche services are often run independently, PIL recently began cooperating as a vessel provider on the Transpacific West Coast alongside COSCO and Wan Hai. Furthermore, PIL has additional access to the Transpacific with slots on Ocean Alliance services and with no fewer than 16 x 11,800teu vessels on order it also has plans of entering the Transpacific East Coast trade lane.

Wan Hai deploys over 50% of its deployed capacity to the intra-Asia markets reflected by its strong dependency on small feeder vessels (Figure 2), which it often operates on its own. Conversely, its deepsea operations are often characterised by being one of multiple operators (usually fellow East Asian lines) in a vessel sharing agreement. The majority of deep sea deployment is on the Far East-Indian Sub-Continent trade lane where there is a high dependency on Panamax vessels with some ISC ports restricted by drafts and hinterland connections. 

Figure 2: Fleet size of the Non alliance shipping lines 2017Q2 (number of vessels)

Source: MDS Transmodal Containership Databank, 2017Q2

Overall, the non alliance shipping lines are characterised by having fleets of smaller size vessels, operating in secondary trade lanes and secondary ports.