The Midlands – North West Rail Link: The Impact on Rail Freight

In October 2023, the then Prime Minister Rishi Sunak formally announced that the Government were abandoning plans to progress HS2 north of Birmingham, with funding re-allocated to a series of smaller scale schemes (known as ‘Network North’). The decision was criticised by many, including the Greater Manchester and West Midlands combined authority Mayors who subsequently commissioned an independent review of the decision. The review report and recommendations were published in September 2024 and the conclusions have significant implications for the freight sector.

HS2 Phase 1 is currently under construction between Old Oak Common (west London) and a new junction on the West Coast Main Line (WCML) near Lichfield (Handsacre Junction), along with the spur line into the new Birmingham Curzon Street terminus. The second phase of HS2 was to be constructed in two sections. Phase 2a would extend from Handsacre Junction to Crewe. Phase 2b included the eastern leg from Birmingham to Yorkshire (via the East Midlands) and a continuation of Phase 2a from Crewe into an expanded Manchester Piccadilly station. While the eastern leg was previously cancelled in 2021 (due to cost-overruns), up until late Summer 2023 the Government was still officially promoting the full completion of the western leg to Crewe and Manchester. However, Rishi Sunak announced in October 2023 the formal abandonment of Phase 2, along with pausing work on the Old Oak Common to Euston section in order to examine a private sector funded solution.

Many in the railway industry and beyond consider this situation to be unsustainable in the medium to long-term. The planned connection to the WCML at Handsacre Junction is onto the so called ‘slow lines’ (used by freight and stopping passenger trains) as it was only meant to be lightly-used under the full Phase 2 scheme. It will also place a significant number of additional passenger trains onto the two-track section through Shugborough Tunnel and across the ‘at-grade’ Colwich Junction passing towards Stoke-on-Trent; this is already a known bottleneck on the WCML. In addition, the expanded Manchester Piccadilly station was designed with platforms able to accommodate 2 x 200m HS2 train-sets. The existing station will only be able to accommodate a single 200m train-set, which will have around 20% fewer seats when compared with a 265m long Class 390 ‘Pendolino’ train which currently operate on the Euston-Manchester route.

As currently being built, HS2 Phase 1 will release capacity on the existing WCML south of Rugby for other uses, such as additional freight or semi-fast passenger services, which (ultimately) was the principal rationale for constructing the new line. However, due to the truncation of HS2 at Handsacre Junction, it appears that north of Lichfield the opposite will now be the case. Capacity modelling work undertaken by MDS Transmodal indicates that, at best, future capacity for freight to the North West and Scotland will effectively be capped at current levels, thereby restricting growth. It may also be the case that some existing freight services will need to be removed from the timetable in order to accommodate HS2’s planned trains which, as described, are likely to offer fewer seats than current services. This is against a background where the Government has set a long-term target to grow rail freight by 75% up to 2050.

Given this position, the Greater Manchester and West Midlands combined authority Mayors decided to commission an independent review of the decision. Chaired by David Higgins (former CEO of Network Rail and Chair of HS2) and led by consultants Arup, the review considered the implications of the cancellation decision, potential infrastructure options and funding models for delivery. The review’s report and recommendations were published in September 2024.

After concluding that the abandonment decision is likely to have a negative impact in terms of inter-regional connectivity, railway network capacity (passenger and freight), economic growth and productivity, the report then went on to examine various potential infrastructure solutions. This included road-based options, although they were rejected as they would not address the inter-regional capacity gap or solve the rail operational challenges outlined. Three rail-based solutions were considered, covering upgrading the existing WCML infrastructure (Concept A), a combination of upgrades and some new tracks (Concept B) and an entirely new railway line (Concept C).

Concept C would effectively replicate the now abandoned HS2 alignment from Handsacre Junction to north Cheshire via Crewe, albeit with a lower design speed (300km/h rather than 400km/h), using ballasted track (not slab-track) and to British main line loading gauge (rather than UIC gauges). Due to these design changes, the report concludes that this could be achieved for around 60-75% of the capital costs of the original HS2 scheme. Concept C would also offer the highest net benefits, a step-change in capacity and network performance improvements (over Concepts A and B). The report consequently recommends it should be taken forward, but branded as the Midlands-North West Rail Link rather than HS2).

The report suggests that Handsacre Junction to Crewe is delivered first, as the planning powers already exist. The report assumes the continuation of the proposed line from north Cheshire into Manchester is delivered as part of the Northern Powerhouse Rail (NPR) project and the report also acknowledges that Crewe station will require a solution to ‘join up’ the two sections; this is not addressed, noting that further work is required with Network Rail.

Three important questions remain to be answered. Firstly, can the recommended Midlands-North West Rail Link be funded in the current environment? The report suggests a ‘blended’ funding strategy whereby public (Government) borrowing is combined with private sector equity, similar to the way many mainland European infrastructure projects, such as the Tour to Bordeaux LGV extension, are financed . HM Treasury is understood to be examining an updated version of Public-Private Partnership solutions, and the Budget on 30 October proposed a new method of measuring public borrowing when used for funding infrastructure. However, the budget did not mention the Midlands-North West Rail Link or HS2 Phase 2a.

Secondly, will NPR be delivered? The recommended solution from the report is dependent on the northern Mayors’ preferred route alignment for NPR – via Warrington, north Cheshire and Manchester Airport. This alignment is not certain at this stage and it is understood the Department for Transport has been considering alternative options. Both NPR and the Crewe to north Cheshire section of the Midlands-North West Rail Link will require planning powers, most likely via an Act of Parliament. This will require Government time in Parliament and departmental support.

Finally, will the Midlands-North West Rail Link benefit rail freight? The Rail Link, as proposed in the report, will certainly release capacity on the existing WCML between Handsacre Junction and Crewe by diverting HS2 trains away from the Shugborough Tunnel/Colwich Jn bottleneck. This could, in part, be reallocated to freight to allow for growth. However, known constraints on other sections of the WCML, including Crewe to Warrington via Weaver Junction and north of Preston, will remain unresolved, particularly as HS2 trains to Lancaster and Scotland will be routed that way. Further, plans for new intermodal terminals at Parkside (ILP North) and Port Salford on the Chat Moss line will, in all likelihood, be dependent on the northern Mayors’ preferred route alignment for NPR to provide relief in the Earlestown area.

Overall, the independent review recommends a plausible and viable way forward. Part of the suggested alignment has existing planning powers, while the rest of the route could potentially be incorporated into the NPR consent process. The new line could also be used as a ‘test bed’ for a new funding model, with HM Treasury keen on attracting private finance into infrastructure funding. The Budget on 30 October also paved the way for higher borrowing to finance infrastructure. However, much uncertainty remains, particularly with respect to the ultimate delivery of NPR.