The Strait of Hormuz - a strategically vital waterway

The Strait of Hormuz connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea, making it one of the most strategically important maritime routes in the world, particularly for global energy exports. An estimated 20% of the world’s petroleum and a substantial share of liquefied natural gas (LNG) transit through this narrow passage. While the exact percentage may vary, what matters most is the strategic importance of the Strait; its closure would signal a major escalation of geopolitical instability in the Middle East. As a critical chokepoint, any disruption would suggest that regional tensions have reached a breaking point, severely impairing the region’s ability to function economically and politically. A closure would not only hinder the outward flow of key energy commodities (especially crude oil and LNG vital to global markets) but also disrupt the importation of essential goods into Gulf countries. The resulting impact would reverberate far beyond the region, straining global supply chains, driving up energy prices, and threatening international energy security. 

Iran controls the northern shore of the Strait of Hormuz, which places it in a strategically dominant position over one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints. This geographic advantage allows Iran to exert significant influence on regional maritime traffic, especially energy exports. During the recent Israel-Iran conflict, Iran threatened to close the Strait and this threat has been used over the years as a tool of geopolitical leverage, particularly during times of heightened tension with the West or regional rivals. Such threats serve as a warning that any escalation in conflict could disrupt global energy supplies. 

A closure of the Strait of Hormuz (on top of the already-disrupted Red Sea corridor) would deliver a double blow to regional and global shipping networks, forcing carriers into a complex reconfiguration of Gulf services. Mainline container services to the Gulf would likely be suspended or rerouted, with a possible pivot to feeder-based strategies via alternative hubs - though even these would be constrained by the elevated security risks across both chokepoints. The position of Jebel Ali as the region’s primary transhipment and logistics hub would come under significant pressure. With both Hormuz and the Red Sea compromised, its connectivity to Asia, Africa, and Europe would deteriorate - raising questions about the port’s resilience and long-term role. Reorientation of regional trade flows toward the Red Sea and East Mediterranean would no longer be a viable contingency. Ports like Jeddah, Aqaba, or Damietta, which previously offered alternatives to Gulf gateways, are themselves facing reduced reliability and heightened risk due to attacks and delays on the Red Sea route. This overlapping chokepoint crisis would likely accelerate investment in overland connectivity, such as the Gulf Railway, inland distribution networks, and multimodal corridors linking Gulf states to the Levant, Turkey and even Central Asia. However, these long-term solutions will not resolve the acute short-term supply chain disruptions.

So, while the headline risk remains to oil and gas, the deeper vulnerability is the region’s dependence on a narrow set of maritime corridors for its entire economic model. A simultaneous disruption of the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea trade lanes would isolate the Arabian Gulf from global container trade, halting the movement of everything from consumer goods and machinery to industrial components and humanitarian supplies. This scenario would expose the fragility of the Gulf’s port-centric supply chains and may prompt a fundamental reassessment of logistics strategies, diversification of routes and the geopolitical risks embedded in maritime trade.

Conclusion

The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints, carrying around a third of global oil trade by volume and nearly a fifth of global gas exports. Its closure would severely disrupt global energy markets, with the Gulf region - particularly Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait - most exposed. Major importers such as China, India, Japan and South Korea would face supply shortages and price volatility, impacting industrial output and economic stability.

While containerised cargo flows are less dependent on the Strait, a simultaneous closure alongside the Red Sea crisis would compound supply chain risks, isolate Gulf ports and force carriers to reroute or suspend services. This would expose the region’s reliance on a narrow set of maritime corridors for both exports and essential imports, highlighting the fragility of its port-centric economic model.

For the UK, the direct share of imports from the Gulf is relatively small (around 4% by weight), but this includes critical energy supplies, meaning indirect impacts through price spikes and supply chain volatility could still be substantial. The strategic importance of ensuring freedom of navigation through the Strait therefore extends beyond regional interests, underpinning broader global energy security and trade stability.

In short, any sustained disruption would ripple far beyond the Gulf, affecting major Asian energy importers, global oil and gas markets, container trade routes and the resilience of Europe’s energy transition - all while exposing the urgency of diversifying supply chains and investing in alternative connectivity routes.